Iran and the Azerbaijani wind (4) | Arabic Independent

Iran and the Azerbaijani wind (4) | Arabic Independent
Iran and the Azerbaijani wind (4) | Arabic Independent

It can be said that the relations between Tehran and Baku did not go through this state of tension and escalation over the past three decades after the declaration of independence of Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Soviet Union on October 18 (October) 1991. The escalation between the two parties reached unprecedented levels, especially after the recent military operations For the Azerbaijani army, which aimed to control the Armenian state of Syunik, which introduces a fundamental change in the geopolitical map of the Caucasus region, so Baku was able to secure a land corridor under its control linking it with the autonomous region in Nakhchivan, and imposing its control over the strategic crossing of trade and transit that connects Iran with Europe and other countries. Central Asia, thus raising the financial costs for Iranian goods exported through this corridor.
And if the Iranian regime believes that one of the main factors in the escalatory Azerbaijani positions is due to an Israeli role that seeks to utilize its strategic relationship with Baku and turn it into a factor of strategic pressure and threat, Tehran also does not exonerate the Turkish side, which stands by the Azerbaijani ambitions to redraw the geopolitical features. of the southern Caucasus region.
The policy of “strategic patience” adopted by Iranian diplomacy, according to the official description, and the concern for calm with Baku, did not prevent the two sides from walking on the “edge of war” despite all the efforts made by Tehran to prevent reaching this option and its repercussions that are open to all possibilities.
The policy of assimilation practiced by Tehran with Baku is governed by the Iranian regime’s attempt not to fall into the trap that the Turkish-Israeli element is trying to set for it on its northern borders. August) 2021. Especially since the regime’s leadership has a firm conviction that all parties affected by its continued role and influence in the Middle East region are seeking to create hotbeds of tension in Iran’s vicinity on various fronts and in all its places of influence, to force it to make political and practical concessions, including the nuclear program. .
The Iranian shock, which departs from the context of the policy of assimilation it is practicing in its diplomacy with Baku, came in the process of storming the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran by a person, which led to the killing of one of the embassy’s security officers. Baku quickly closed its embassy and considered the motives far from personal, according to the Iranian version, and it cannot be accepted that they are the result of a dispute between the attacker and his wife, who took refuge in Baku.

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In an escalatory step, Baku and President Ilham Aliyev had another opinion, describing what happened as a “terrorist” attack in his speech to the Security Conference in Munich and submitting a complaint to the Security Council against Iran and holding it responsible for what its diplomatic mission was subjected to, and that Tehran must pay the price, and the repercussions did not stop. This position is at this point, and it launched a massive campaign of arrests for anyone suspected of being linked to Tehran under the pretext of fighting and dismantling Iranian spy networks.
For its part, Baku adopted a policy of escalation and defiance with Tehran, realizing the extent of Iranian confusion and hesitation in responding to the measures it is taking. The extensive maneuver carried out by the “Revolutionary Guards” and the army, in which they crossed the Aras River border with Azerbaijan, the latter responded to with a wide maneuver. Also on the border, with the participation of the Turkish army on land, and another in the Caspian Sea (the Caspian Sea), a maneuver that was not far from Israeli supervision, which was able to obtain a military air base in Azerbaijan near the Iranian border. This prompted Tehran to use the air force and conduct air patrols of “F4” and “F14” aircraft along the joint area to keep pace with these maneuvers.
This escalation prompted the Iranian decision-making circles to resort to the Turkish neighbor in an attempt to calm the situation, especially since Ankara has a clear role and influence alongside Tel Aviv on the decision in Baku, as expressed by the contact that Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi made with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and then the visit he made It brought Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian to the Turkish capital, to discuss the mechanisms of calm with Baku and the need for Ankara to play a positive role in this context. The haste of the Iranian president and his foreign minister to announce the positive results of these contacts and discussions reveals the extent of Tehran’s confusion and its desire to close this file or reduce the level of tension and not be forced to open a new front of confrontation, at a time when it is installing new equations in the Middle East region, especially in light of The historic tripartite agreement that it signed with Saudi Arabia under Chinese auspices on March 10, which led to entering the region in a constructive and positive atmosphere and a new path of openness and cooperation.

Iran’s efforts to keep its northern border away from the circle of tension and bombing, does not mean that it has been able to disrupt the Israeli efforts to open a new confrontation front with it, after the possibility of establishing a wall of confrontation with it in the Middle East receded. However, on the other hand, it cannot overlook the Turkish role, which is no less than the Israeli role with Baku and in the Caucasus region, especially since Ankara views the Iranian steps and the understandings and agreements it concludes with the countries of the region and the Middle East as not being in the context of its national and strategic interests. It must accept a Turkish partnership in any political arrangements and equations that may be reached, specifically in the Syrian arena after it was able to enter into the formula that Turkey installed with Russia with the participation of the regime in Syria to discuss the mechanisms of a political solution in the areas under Turkish control, and once again imposed itself as a partner in This equation.